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Introduction 
In this essay， 1 offer an overview of the economic development in the 
U.S.S.R. from the post-NEP era through the First Five-Year Plan. My 
main question dealing with this period concerns the nature of the Soviet 
First FiveャYearPlan. Wbat did the Soviet leadership intend to do with 
this scheme? How can we assess the outcome of the economic strategy in 
the context of later historical developments? Were the results what the 
planners had expected? 1 intend to discuss these issues. 
1. The Agrarian Situation before the First Five-Year Plan 
The characteristics of the agrarian situation by the end of NEP (1924 
-1928) can be summed up as follows: By 1927 food production had risen 
to the 1913 level， yet the marketed surplus grain available for urban 
consumption and export was less than a third of its pre-war volume.1 
Howard ]. Sherman， in The Soviet Economy， mentions the same view 
regarding the recovery of agricultural produciton during the NEP era : 
As early as 1925-26 (the harvest year runs from October 1 to Septem-
ber 30) the total agricultural area reached 95 percent of the pre-war 六
average while the gross harvest was ev巴nhigher than pre-war...Yet 
one critical agricultural probl巴mremained which had to be confronted 
at once: although agriclultural output had reached the pre-war level， 
the agricultural suYJりlusavilabie to be marketed outside of the village 
1 M. K. Dziewanowski. A Histoη， 01Soviet Russia. p. 179. 
。
The statistics， which give evidence to these accounts and are drawn from 
Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow， 1934， p.4)， shows the following. 
(1913) 
(105.0) 
(80.1) 
(35.5*) 
(58.9り
(20.3*) 
was stil far from the pre-war level in 1925-26. (p.65) 
1925 
104.3 
62.1 
72.5 
27.1 
1922 
77.7 
50.3 
24.1 
45.8 
Sown area (million hectares) 
Grain harvest (million tons) 
Horses (million head) 
Cattle (million head) 
Pigs (milIion head) 21.8 12.0 
* 1916 
p. 101. 
The principal reason， acording to Alec Nove， for low marketings was 
the shift to a small-peasant subsistence-type economy.l Howard Sherman 
offered a similar interpretation， stating that "the problem was simply that 
the relatively equal distribution of land achieved by the peasants was 
itself the main r，巴asonfor the decline of the marketable surplus."2 Thus， 
by the end of 1928， the agrarian situation for more than 80% of Russian 
peasants was that they could produce mainly for subsistence， not for 
A官tEco悦omicHistoη01 the U.S.S.R. 
market. 
Nonetheless， the situation was an improvement， not a set-back. As 
shown in the following account， "(i)n 1925 the peasants were eating better， 
selling less，吋 thelivelihood of the Russian peasantry improved through 
the NEP. In summation， Prof. Sherman stated it this way_' 
The agrarian revolution of 1917 and the modest monetary tax on the 
peasants introduced during NEP had resulted not only in peasant 
?????
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control， but in the ability of the peasant to actually keep much of the 
harvest for his own consumption (which had previously been at， or 
sometimes below， subsistence level). 
In the meantime， there stil existed a question as to whether the small 
agricultural surplus was enough 1) to feed the growing urban working 
population， and 2) to provide the exports to be exchanged for machinery.' 
Along with these questions， a structural problem of the smallest land 
holdings became evident: despite the fact that their total grain produc. 
tion rose from 50% to 85% of prewar， the ratio of their marketed grain 
to total production declined from 15% to 11%.2 
1. The Industrial Situation before the First Five-Year Plan 
Just as agricultural production rose by 1927 to the 19131evel， industrial 
prodiction also rose sharply during the period 1924 to 1927. 
Volume of Industrial Output in the U.S.S.R.， 1913-1927 
Year Output (as % of 1913) 
1913 100 
1917 
1921 
1925 
1926 
1927 
71 
31 
73 
98 
111 
Source: Central Statistical Board of the U.S.S.R.， National Economy 五
J¥ of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House， 1957) :; 
p. 41， inThe Soviet Economy， p.67. 
1 ibid. p. 65. 
2 ibid. p. 6. 
However， the nature of the increase in industrial production consisted 
of output from reconstructed facilities， rather than the building of new 
plant and equipment.1 Another characteristic of this period was that the 
emphasis had been placed on Iight industry， rather than on the heavy 
industry which later absorbed huge investment from 1928 onwards in the 
first-five year plan. The other crucial point was the relationship between 
industry and agriculture. To be specific， there occurred a disparity in廿le
prices of foodstu妊sand industiral goods.2 Under these circumstances， a 
sharp shift in development policy， coupled with the debate over the 
strategy， took place in the late 1920s. 
11. The Industrializaiton Oebate 
The issue， both the right and left wings argued， was the mehtod of 
establishing a socialist industrial state in a country with only an under.圃
developed agricultural economy: How to modernize the backward econ-
omy， how to reise money. and how fast should this program of develop. 
ment be completed? 
The Ieft， headed by Trotsky， took the view that NEP must be quickly 
ended and a transition must be made to the rapid grwoth of socialist 
industry.3 The perception of rapid growth strategy was to be extended to 
the counttyside by the fullest encouragement of agriculturaI cooperatives 
to replace the tiny peasant farms.4 As an advocate of "permanent 
revolution，" Trotsky denied "the possibility of socialism in a single 
country." However， he was also the main proponent of the rapid and 
ambitious investment program in heavy industry. Moreover， Trotsky 
?????
p.178. 
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argued that such an industrial expansion program could be achieved only 
by detai!ed and comprehensive economic planning under the direction of 
the State Planning Commission.' 
The next issue was th巴wayof financing investment in heavy industry. 
How could the capital be raised? Preobrazhensky， Trotsky's economic 
spokesman， argued that up to a half of al the profits of Soviet trade and 
industry were going into private hands under the NEP! 
perception. See the below.) 
(Accurate 
1929 1928 1926-7 1925-6 
61.0 (%) 52.7 48.7 45.9 Socializ巴d
39.0 47.3 51.1 54.1 Private 
An Economic Histoη 01 the UぷS.R.p.127. 
Based on this perception， Preobrazhensky advocated nationalizing 
these enterprises so as to increase the profits available for government 
investment in industry.3 He also encouraged the policy of squeezing the 
agriculutral sector in order to raise capital. The other measures to 
generate capital included the following: taxation， expecially of capitalist 
profit; infiationary printing of money; manipulation of the banking sys-
tem and the market. 4 
The main critic of this leftist policy was Bukharin. Rykov， Kalinin， 
The concept of Bukharin's development 
?????
and Stalin joined with him. 
program was optimality and balanced growth. He was concerned that 
there should be an optimal combination of producer-goods and consumer-
goods， and that both industry and agriculture should grow together at an 
optimum rate.5 Accodingly， Bukharin could not be as tough on the 
peasant as the leftists. In his concept， industry should not grow at the 
p.66. The Economic Develo.ψment 01 the USSR. 
ibid. p.71. 
ibid. p.72. 
ibid_ p.72. 
Roger Munting. 
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expense of agriculture. Industry was dependent upon agriculture as a 
source of supply of raw materials and on peasant demand.1 With respect 
to the speed of industrialization， Bukharin favored gradual development 
so that its rate would be governed directly by the growth in agricultural 
ouput and exchange. 
Preobrazhensky and Trotsky countered the right with the following 
political and economic reasons.2 The left claimed that the right wing 
policy would strenghten the rich farmers and thereby weaken the commu' 
nist political base. In addition， the left argued that the leftist policy would 
hanmer out the "scissors" problem and peasant dissatisfaction once and 
for al!， because rapid industrialization would eventually result in an 
increased ftow of manufactured consumer goods to the villages. Final!y， 
they claimed that small amounts of resources drawn gradually from the 
agricultural sector would never make industry move on a:self司sustaining
basis of expansion， because of the lack of an initial "big push" to develop-
ment. For these reasons， the left insisted On the rapid development 
strategy in heavy industry. 
Eventually， neither the right nor the left became a predominant force 
in th巴party，because Stalin manipulated this ideological schism. Sta1in at 
first sided with the right to defeat the left and to exile Trotsky. Then he 
showed a dramatic swing to an ultra-Ieft position， and used the remnants 
of the left in order to defeat the right. 
In 1925 atthe Fourteenth Party Congress， Stalin and the Center faction 
ful!y supported the right wing policies， ofwhich Bukharin had become the 
major spokesman.3 Basical!y， this standing continued at earliest until the 
五 FifteenthParty Congress in October 1927， when Trotsky was exil巴dto 
五
:;: Siberia and then out of the country. Stalin's attack， then， shifted dramati網
/、
cally to Bukharin. Bukharin was vigorously criticized in the April 1929 
plenum of the central committee as a right wing deviationist， and was 
1 ibid. p. 68. 
2 Following ar邸lmentswere discussed in The Soveit Economy. p. 73. 
3 ibid. p. 73. 
expelled from the politbureau in November 1929. 
IV. The First-Five Year Plan 
Agriculture 
The purpose of collectivization can be suggested in the speech of 
Stalin at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930. He spoke of "the sweeping 
offensive of Socialism along the whole front， of the elimination of the 
kulaks as a c1ass， and of the realization of solid coll巴ctivization.川 The
speed of collectivization was accelerated particularly through the end of 
1929 to early 1930. In fact， by March 10， 1930 the coIlectivization of the 
peasant households reached 58%， though it was only 4% on October 1， 
1929. (On 1 June 1929， the total number of collectivized peasants was 
barely one million， and of these 60% were in the TOZ (loose) type of 
producers' cooperatives. By 1 October the number had risen to 1.9 million， 
62% of which was TOZ.)2 
?????
Stalin was aware of the rapid acceleration of collectivization and 
reduced the pressure in March 1930. People were allowed to leave the 
collective farms， and the percentage of collectivized households fel to 
28% by May， 1930， and to 21% by September.3 However， this policy was 
rev巴rsedsoon and by a year later， inJune of 1931 the rate of collectiviza-
tion went up to 52%. As a result， kulaks were largely liquidated in 1930， 
and "kulak and better-off" peasants became the next target to be attack-
This policy was continuously pursued and by 1936， 90.5% of the 
peasants were collectivized. In the meantime， collectivization was equiva. 
lent for the peasantry to being "manipulated" in their output by the state. 
The peasants could not enjoy consumption， though during .the NEP and 
afterwards they were allowed to enjoy it to a c日rtaindegree. 
ed. 
Op‘cit.， The Soviet Economy. p. 82. 
Op. cit.， An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. p.151. 
ibid. p.83. 
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One of main instruments of control of the farms was， until March 1958， 
the Motor Tractor Station (MTS). Owned by the state， the station 
provided the machinery necessary to sow and harvest the crops. For these 
services the farms had to pay a fixed price， most of which was in crops. 
Collectivization seemed to achieve the following three purposes‘First， 
collectivization eliminated kulaks as a class and strenghtened socialism 
over the countryside politically as well as economically. Second， col-
lectivization， with the introduction of machinery， freed a considerable 
number of laborers who then could be pumped into the urban labor 
market. Third， inspite of the lower total production， this policy could 
procure the amount of grain which was marketed and was used as 
"capital" without taxing industry too much.' 
Industry 
With respect to industrial dev巴lopmentin the five-year plan， ithad 
three goals2: First， the plan intended to expand and modernize the 
already functioning industries. Second， itwas to construct entirely new 
branches of industry to complement the existing plants. Third， itaimed 
to alter the U.S.S.R.'s economic geography through relocating those 
plants which were too close to the exposed western or southern frontiers 
of the country and placing them further away in more secure places. The 
plan was launched in August 1929 and was officially announced at the end 
of 1932 that the overall objectives of the plan had been achieved ahead of 
time. (Thus， officially described as success.) 
This scheme was based on the following three assumptions3: (1) no 
豆 seriousfailure in agrarian production would occur， (2) an expansion of 
exports and imports would take place， and (3) there would be increases in 
)¥ 
、~ productivity throughout the economy， including labor productivity and 
1 These arguments were followed by Op. cit. A History 01 Soviet 
Russia. p. 187 and Op. cit. The Soviet Economy. p. 75. 
2 Op. cit. A History 01 Soviet Russia. p. 188. 
3 Op‘cit. The Soviet Economy. p.80. 
grain yield per acre. With these presumptions， the plan called for a fourth 
to a third of national income to be poured into net investment， while the 
rate of comsumption in national income was to be restrained from 77% to 
Under the First Five-Year Plan， the twototalIy new industrial centers 
were estab!ished: une was in the Urals (Magnitogorsk) and the other in 
Engineering works in the Moscow and 
Leningrad areas were expanded. The Dnieper dam was built. In addition 
to these projects， industrialization was introduced to the more backward 
republics. These included a textile mill in Central Asia， mining in 
Kazakhstan， and engineering in Georgia.1 
Before assessing the results， 1 will briefty examine the three assump-
tions mentioned above as prer巴quisitesfor plan fulfillment and then 
discuss the succ巴活sof the plan. First， there were harvest errors. Second， 
foreign trade moved against the Soviet Union. Third， productivity did not 
rise as was estimated. 
66%. 
southern Siberia (Kuznetsk). 
?????
The Soviet Union had to import most of nonferrous metal require-
The Great ments， by exporting grain， lumber， and other raw materials. 
Depression of 1929 pushed the prices of these raw materials to rather low 
levels and the Soviets could not earn much money as was espected. un the 
other hand， the prices of imports such as machinery and equipment fel 
only by 20%-" Furthermore， between 1929 and 1932， the volume of imports 
rose fourfold， an extent which was too far to offset the fal of the prices. 
Though the increased labor productivity was not clearly calculated， 
the expected increases in labor procuctivity did not seem to be forth-
coming. As a matter of fact， a constant shortage of labor in the urban 
sector did not seem to work to increase its productiviety， because labor 
"surplus" which was coercively created in the countryside compensated 
the demand in quantity without increasing productivity. In fact， wages 
rose due in some part to the shortage of labor. 
up. cit. An Economic History 01 the U.S.S.R. p. 185. 
up. cit. The Soviet Economy. p. 85. 
1 
2 
If one defines success as the degree of accomphishments vis-a-vis 
initial goals， neither qualitatively nor quantitatively but in a more general 
sense， the FFYP can be assessed as fair1y successful. The scheme could 
achieve the three major objectives to a considerable degree， despite the 
fact that the major assumptions were not sustained. First of al!， expan. 
sion and modernization of industry was largely achieved. Second， as was 
discussed in page. 103， entirely new branches of industry were introduced 
in more backward republics， for example， Central Asia， Kazakhstan， and 
As for the third intention， the relocation of industrial centers 
was also appreciable. In 1929 the U.S.S.R. had four major industrial 
centers-Leningrad (metal!urgical and machine industry)， Moscow (con-
sumer goods， mainly textiles)， the Ukraine (mining， metallurgy， and food 
processing)， and the Urals (mining and metallurgy). By 1937-38， three new 
industrial centers were built in Central Asia， Siberia， and the Far East， al
of which were far away from the vulnerable Western frontiers of the U. 
V. Results 
Georgia. 
S.S.R. 
However， ifone defines succeぉ asthe degree of actual achievements 
vis.a.vis intended goals， the FFVP was far from being successfu!， except 
in the Transport and Communications Sector. I But the reason did not 
simply lie in the poor achievements but more conceivably in "overam. 
bitious" goals set in the plan itself. In retrospect， the scheme showed 
sharply disproportional growth， with marked stress on industry and 
construction. Their capital stocks were to rise 2.4 and 3.5 times， while 
housing capital was planned to rise by 19% and agricultureal capital by 
29%." Even so， both Industry and Construction Sectors did not achieve 
their targeted goals. Agricultural output substantially declined.3 In any 
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Holland Hunter. "The Overambitious First Soviet Five.Year Plan." 
in the Slavic Raview. June 1973. p.245. 
ibid. p.241‘ 
Op. cit. An Economic Hisお1)101 the UぷS'.R.p圃 176.
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2 
3 
case， whichever definitions we may take， the human cost paid for these 
projects was not negIigible at al1. 
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